---
title: One Outage Away from a Banking Ground Stop? The Fragility of Modern Banking
source_page: https://www.sardine.ai/media/fraud-forward/episodes/banking-ground-stop
canonical: https://www.sardine.ai/media/fraud-forward/episodes/banking-ground-stop
format: text/markdown
date: 2026-11-18T04:01:00.000Z
description: A banking ground stop could begin with one failed system. The FAA and 2021 Fedwire outages show what fraud teams should plan for before recovery even starts…
---

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# One Outage Away from a Banking Ground Stop? The Fragility of Modern Banking

**Published:** 2026-11-18T04:01:00.000Z

A banking ground stop could begin with one failed system. The FAA and 2021 Fedwire outages show what fraud teams should plan for before recovery even starts…

What’s up fraud fighters, and welcome back to Fraud Forward!
It is International Fraud Awareness Week, and I am going to spend it somewhere you might not expect. We are talking about airplanes.
On Friday, November 13, the FAA stopped flights across the country after a problem in its telecommunications network. There was no storm and no attack that anyone has confirmed. A technology failure rippled through a national system. As I read the details, I kept picturing a bank. Our cores, our payment rails, our fraud platforms, and the vendors that connect them all sit beneath an app that customers expect to work every hour of every day. In this episode, I walk through what happened, why a banking ground stop is a fair question to ask, and what a fraud team should know before an outage and after the systems come back.
I am not predicting a collapse. I am asking whether our fraud programs are ready for a very bad Friday afternoon
What you’ll hear in this episode:
What the FAA telecommunications outage showed about legacy equipment, shared infrastructure, and a routine upgrade that went sideways
Why a banking ground stop is a fair question, and how 24/7 banking expectations sit on top of legacy core banking systems
What the 2021 Federal Reserve Fedwire outage taught us about backlogs, including the Fedwire and FedACH disruption
Why several vendors do not guarantee redundancy, and what to ask about the dependencies behind your fraud vendors
What happens to fraud monitoring during an outage, including queued, delayed, and pending transactions
How criminals can use the confusion of an outage as a pretext, and why frontline staff and the contact center need guidance
Why recovery is its own project, from alert backlogs and duplicate processing to reconciling transactions and validating fraud controls
Why your business continuity plan needs fraud in it, and who has the authority to pause activity
Five questions to take back to your team this week
You should listen to this episode if you:
Lead or support fraud at a community bank or credit union and want to plan for operational resilience
Have a business continuity plan and wonder whether it covers fraud
Are planning a core conversion or a new integration and want to protect fraud monitoring through the change
Manage vendor relationships and want to look past the SOC report to the infrastructure behind it
Want a reason to ask for a seat at the operational resilience table
### Episode notes
What happened with the FAA
On Friday afternoon, the FAA’s telecommunications network began to struggle. The agency later explained that its legacy equipment became unstable when roughly 1,000 connection attempts arrived every four to five seconds. That disrupted aircraft communications and radar feeds at 17 of its 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers, and the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop that lasted more than four hours. Early findings pointed to two locations, including one in Arkansas where a contractor was installing a router while the network moved away from older copper technology. The FAA says it has no indication of a cyberattack, and the investigation is ongoing. Routine work on aging infrastructure had national consequences, and that is the part I want every financial institution to sit with.
Why banking should look in the mirror
Our industry has plenty to be proud of. We open accounts digitally, move money in seconds, use AI to spot unusual behavior, and have started to imagine AI agents acting for consumers. Behind that progress, many institutions still run core systems designed decades ago, then patched, customized, and integrated until replacement became a massive project. I am not saying legacy is bad. Many of these systems are reliable, and age alone does not make technology unsafe. What changed is what we ask of them. We went from banking hours to 24/7 access on a phone, and the customer sees one app while a network of vendors, processors, and integrations works behind it. As we talk about agentic commerce, we are layering new capability on legacy banking infrastructure that was never designed for it. Technology can fail without an attacker, and the real question is whether our organizations can withstand it.
Shared infrastructure and the 2021 Fedwire outage
We have seen shared infrastructure stumble before. On February 24, 2021, the Federal Reserve had a service disruption that affected Fedwire, FedACH, and other services. The cause was an operational error, not a criminal. It lasted several hours, and backlogs and processing issues followed even after services resumed. Even the best fraud team relies on infrastructure it does not control. I also want us to look at vendor risk management more closely. We perform due diligence, review contracts, collect SOC reports, and read business continuity plans. Do we know the fourth party dependencies behind our fraud vendors? If my core provider relies on another provider, and my fraud platform shares infrastructure with my core, I may not have the redundancy I think I have. Shared vendor infrastructure is not necessarily a problem. It becomes one when we don’t know about it.
What an outage means for a fraud team
Picture a Friday afternoon at a community bank or credit union. Your core, your processor, or the integration between your fraud monitoring platform and transaction processing fails. Customers call, branches have questions, and the contact center is overwhelmed. Frontline staff need guidance on what they can and cannot do. Meanwhile, your fraud team needs answers. Can we still see activity? Are alerts generating? Are transactions queued or held? Is the system that makes our fraud decisions still running? When everything returns, will alerts generate retroactively? How do we sort out what was authorized, processed, failed, or needs another look? Those are fraud questions, and manual procedures only help when they have been practiced. Criminals can also use the confusion as a pretext, by posing as the institution and asking customers to verify accounts. I am not saying every outage leads to fraud. I am saying fraud scenario planning for outages belongs in the plan.
A stretched team and a seat at the table
Our benchmarking report surveyed 165 fraud leaders at community banks, regional banks, and credit unions. Of those, 71.1% said their teams were strained or over capacity, and 84% were satisfied with their fraud technology. At the same time, 62.3% named high false positives as a limitation, and leaders raised concerns about configuration flexibility, core integration, and reporting. Friction in normal times shows up in a crisis. I am a believer in better technology and in AI, and I work in this space every day. A new tool does not make a program resilient. What good is real-time decisioning if the integration fails? That is why fraud needs a seat at the table. Most leaders in the report feel valued, and being valued is different from being involved. If a new payment capability goes live, who asks what happens to fraud controls if the integration fails? During a core conversion, who makes sure monitoring and alerting stay intact? Those questions should not be asked for the first time during an outage.
What a ground stop looks like in banking
The FAA stopped flights because it decided the system was not stable enough to continue safely, and I would like us to ask what a ground stop looks like in banking. Do you have the authority to restrict a payment channel, suspend certain transactions, or require additional verification during an outage? Are there thresholds, and who makes the call if the usual person is unavailable? Banking is not aviation, and legal, liquidity, and customer considerations all apply. I am not suggesting we shut down payments every time something breaks. I am suggesting we decide in advance what would justify a restriction, who can order it, and how we would explain it. That is why tabletop exercises and business continuity testing matter. When did your fraud team last take part, and did the exercise cover alerts, delayed transactions, scams, and what happens when systems return? Recovery is not a switch. You can restore the technology and still face reconciling transactions, validating fraud controls, and rebuilding confidence.
Five questions to take back to your team
I left five questions for fraud leaders to take back. Do you know which of your fraud controls depend on your core or payment processor, and what each one does if the connection stops? Do you understand where your critical vendors overlap? Does your business continuity plan cover fraud, including how suspicious transactions and unusual customer requests are handled? When systems come back, who reviews the activity, finds missed alerts, prevents duplicate processing, and confirms the controls work again? Finally, does your fraud team have a seat at the operational resilience table? You do not have to own the whole continuity program. You just need to be part of the discussion.
### Key takeaways
A banking ground stop is a fair question, and the answer starts long before an outage.
Technology can fail without an attacker, and fraud teams should plan for that kind of day.
Legacy core banking systems can be reliable, but 24/7 expectations and new capabilities put new demands on them.
The 2021 Fedwire and FedACH disruption shows that shared infrastructure can fail from an operational error.
Having several vendors does not guarantee redundancy when they share underlying infrastructure.
An outage affects fraud monitoring, queued and pending transactions, and the visibility fraud teams normally rely on.
Criminals can use the confusion of an outage as a pretext, which makes frontline guidance part of fraud planning.
Recovery means reconciling transactions, reviewing alert backlogs, preventing duplicate processing, and validating fraud controls.
A business continuity plan needs fraud in it, and the fraud team should take part in testing.
Fraud leaders need a seat at the table for resilience, vendor, and modernization decisions, and need to know who can pause activity.
### Final takeaway
Innovation without resilience is risk we may not fully understand yet. I am not saying we should slow down. I am saying fraud teams should know what happens to their controls when a critical system fails, who can pause activity, and what recovery will take. Ask one question this week that your organization has not asked before. Then make sure you are in the room when the answer gets written down. Protecting customers and members includes being ready for the day things do not go to plan.
Episode resources & links
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Connect with Hailey Windham, CFCS | LinkedIn
Host of the Fraud Forward Podcast
Banking Community Lead at Sardine
Certified Financial Crimes Specialist (CFCS)
2023 Credit Union Rockstar, CU Magazine
Continuous Improvement Award, SAFE Federal Credit Union, 2023
Top 20 Professionals Under 40, The Sumter Item, 2022
